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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL COuRT WnIL NOT
STATE LEGISLATIvE COMMITTEE

ENJOIN
PURSUING AN OSTENSIBLY VALID

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

In 1958, the Virginia General Assembly established the legislative
Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice I to investigate, inter alia, the effectiveness of state statutes 2 proscribing certain
practices defined as barratry 3 maintenance,

4

and champerty. 5

These stat-

utes prohibited any persons or organizations from participating in litigation
6
in which they had no pecuniary interest, or from soliciting persons to

initiate litigation through lawyers retained and controlled by them.7

Three

Negro attorneys, who represented many Negroes in civil rights cases," had
been subpoenaed to testify before the Committee and to produce documents
9
10
concerning their law practice. They brought a federal civil rights action
to enjoin the Committee from harassing and intimidating them, alleging
that its sole function had been to prevent Negro attorneys from repre-

The District Court for the
senting Negroes in civil rights litigation."
Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the action, holding that legislative
§§ 30-42 to -51 (Supp. 1962).
VA. CODE ANN. §§18.1-394 to -400 (1960), §§54-74, -78, -79 (1958).
S.At common law, barratry was "the offense of frequently exciting and stirring
up suits and quarrels . . . either at law or otherwise." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMiIENTAIUmS *134.
4 "Maintenance is . . . an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs
to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute
or defend it. . . . A man may, however, maintain the suit of his . . . poor neighbor,
out of charity and compassion, with impunity." Id. at *134-35.
5 "Champerty . . . is a species of maintenance, . . . being a bargain with a
[party] . . . to divide the land or other matter sued for between them, if they prevail at law; whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party's suit at his own
expense." Id. at *135.
6 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.1-394 to -400 (1960), declared unconstitutional in NAACP
v. Harrison, 202 Va. 142, 116 S.E.2d 55 (1960), rev'd on other grounds mtb noin.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
7
VA. CODE AN. §§ 54-74, -78, -79 (1958), declared unconstitutional as construed in NAACP v. Button, supra note 6.
8
See Brief for Plaintiffs, pp. 3, 7-8, instant case. Plaintiffs claimed to have
represented 147 of an estimated 200 persons charged by Virginia with trespass and
breach of the peace during sit-in demonstrations. Id. at 8.
9 See Reply Brief for Defendants, p. 6, instant case.
10 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958).
' VA. CODE ANN.
2

11 Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that "'the sole function of this committee * * *
has been to investigate, harass, intimidate and urge the prosecution of those lawyers
who are willing to handle cases which may result in an end to some of the forms
Instant
of racial segregation and racial discrimination so prevalent in Virginia."
case at 132.
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committees are immune from judicial interference so long as they pursue
a legislative purpose not plainly illegitimate on its face.'2 Jordan v.
Hutcheson, 208 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Va. 1962).
Plaintiffs complained that the legislature had enacted the statute
creating the Committee in order to impede attacks upon the legality of
Virginia's "massive resistance" -1 to the enforcement of Brown v. Board
of Educ.14 In dismissing the present action, the court relied upon the
principle first articulated in Fletcher v. Peck 15 that a court will not inquire
into the subjective motives for legislative acts. Federal courts have
generally continued to adhere to this principle; 16 they have not invalidated
state or federal investigations because of improper legislative motives,l 7
nor have they enjoined issuance of subpoenas by federal legislative committees in advance of investigation, since the courts have assumed that
the inquiry will be proper.' 8 However, the Supreme Court has denied
enforcement of legislative contempt orders when the legislative inquiry
was not within the scope of a declared legislative purpose,' or when the
witness was given insufficient notice of the scope of the investigation to
determine the pertinency of the questions asked. 0 Although no case has
held that state legislators may not be enjoined, legislators have traditionally
been immune from damage liability for acts performed in their legislative
12

In dictum the court stated that the availability of state procedures to challenge
the subpoena would alone be sufficient to justify abstention, Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167 (1959), in order to allow the Virginia courts an opportunity to rule
on plaintiffs' claims. Instant case at 136. However, the state statute involved in
the present case had already been construed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
NAACP v. Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice, 201 Va.
890, 114 S.E.2d 721 (1960), and the delicate nature of the claim is alone insufficient
to justify invoking the abstention doctrine. Compare Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), with County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959). See generally Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. PA.
L. REv. 344, 345 (1963).
13 See Brief for Plaintiffs, pp. 4-5, instant case. See generally NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963) ; id. at 445-46 (Douglas, J., concurring).
14

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

15 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810).
16 In some cases which invalidated early economic legislation, see, e.g., Child
Labor Tax Case (Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.), 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the Court was willing to try to ascertain congressional motive. This approach has since been repudiated. See, e.g., United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931).
1
7 E.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (federal) ; Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (state).
Is See Pauling v. Eastland, 288 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 900
(1960); Mins v. McCarthy, 209 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (per curiam) ; Fischler
v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 218 F.2d 164
(2d Cir. 1954).
'9 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917)
(federal) ; Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880) (federal); cf. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953)
(federal). But cf. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (federal).
2
OE.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (state); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (federal).
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capacities.2 1 Thus, individuals have been able to challenge an improper
inquiry only by refusing to comply with the subpoena, or refusing to
answer questions before the committee.
In the present case the court felt bound by the Supreme Court decision in Tenney v. Brandhove,2 2 in which a California legislative committee-the Tenney Committee2-3-published information labeling a committee witness as a communist. The witness sued for damages under the
Civil Rights Acts, alleging that the committee's sole purpose in publicizing
the "proofs" of his communist affiliations had been to intimidate him and
silence his opposition to the committee. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its
statement in Fletcher v. Peck that the motives of legislators are not subject
to judicial review 2 4 and dismissed the damage action because investigation
of subversive activities was a proper legislative concern. But Tenney v.
Brandhove does not necessarily preclude injunctive relief.2 5 Federal courts
refusing to enjoin congressional committees 2 6 have relied on the separation
of powers rationale, which does not foreclose federal injunction of state
legislative committee activities2 7 Nevertheless, normal equity restraint
and principles of federalism inherent in the constitutional structure 28 dictate that injunctive relief be withheld when the investigation is arguably
proper and poses no serious threat to constitutional rights.
These judicial principles, however, have not insulated the conduct of
government officials from substantial constitutional challenges.29 The
exercise of a state power to discriminate against a particular class of
21
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951) (state); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (federal). The principle of congressional immunity
is recognized in the Constitution, art. I, § 6: "They [Senators and Representatives]

shall in all Cases, . . . for any Speech or Debate in either House, . . . not be

questioned in any other Place."

See generally Comment, 63 CoLUm. L.

REV.

326

(1963).
22341 U.S. 367 (1951).
23 See generally BARRETT, THE TENNEY CoIniTTEE; LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION
OF SuBvERsIVE AcriTIVTEs IN CALIFORNIA (1951).
24 341 U.S. at 377-78.

25 See id. at 379 (Black, J., concurring).
26 See cases cited note 18 supra.
27 Since separation of powers is not constitutionally required within state governments, see Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 256 (1957) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.), a state court presumably would
not be prohibited from interfering with a state legislature. Federal judicial reluctance
to enjoin state legislative processes would not derive from separation of powers, but
from principles of federalism. See note 28 infra.
28 Sometimes erroneously denominated "separation of powers," the concept of
federalism is enunciated in U.S. CONST. amend. X. Cf. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367 (1951). But federal respect for state institutions should not necessarily
shield infringement of constitutional rights. Compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962); Sky, Judicial Review of Congressional Investigations: Is There an Alternative to Contempt?, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 399, 402-09 (1962). Principles of federalism
probably require an equal respect for state executive agencies, but federal courts have
not hesitated to enjoin them.
29 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) ; Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 280 F.2d
293 (9th Cir. 1960).
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persons 30 will be invalidated even though the statute ostensibly empower2
ing that action is valid on its face.31 Thus, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,8
a
state licensing act was declared unconstitutional as applied because it was
administered to permit only Caucasians to enter the laundry business. In
Norris v. Alabama,3 3 the statistical evidence which revealed that no Negro
had ever served on the grand jury-except once by inadvertence-was
sufficient to cast on the state the burden of proving that jurors were
selected without discrimination. 4 Similarly, the Committee in the present
case should be required to justify its activities under the enabling statute if
plaintiffs can prove their allegations 3 5 that the Committee, regardless of
its motives, had in fact only investigated Negro lawyers who represented
Negroes in civil rights cases.3 6 Although legislators are apparently immune from damage liability, a federal injunction against a state legislative
committee would not be entirely unparalleled.3 7 Nor would precedent
support defendants' contention that injunctive relief is necessarily foreclosed because a damage action could not succeed.3 8 The doctrine of
legislative immunity has been applied only in damage suits.39 Even
though executive officers have normally been immune from damage
liability,40 federal courts have been enjoining unconstitutional executive
action since Ex Parte Young.41 Finally, the absence of a remedy at law
due to legislative immunity from damage liability argues for, rather than
against, injunctive relief.
The constitutionality of the Virginia barratry statutes was not challenged in the present case, but the Supreme Court has since held in
NAACP v. Button 42 that these statutes, as construed by the Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, are unconstitutional because they threaten free
speech and advocacy. Nevertheless, the Committee might still contend
that it was aiding the General Assembly to draft a statute within the
constitutional guidelines of the Button decision,4 or that it was investigat30
E.g.,
31

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
E.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).

32 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

33294 U.S. 587 (1935).
34 Since the state was unable satisfactorily to explain the exclusion of Negroes,
defendant's conviction was reversed.
35 See note 11 supra.
3
6According to plaintiffs' brief, only Negro lawyers represent Negroes in civil

rights cases in Virginia. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 8, instant case. See also NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443-44 (1963).
37 See United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) ; United States v. Owlett,
15 F. Supp. 736 (M.D. Pa. 1936) ; cf. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) (by
implication).
38 See Reply Brief for Defendants, p. 2, instant case.
39 See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)

Thompson,
103 U.S. 168 (1880) (federal).
4
o E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).

(state); Kilbourn v.

See generally Comment, 63 COLUm.

L. REv. 326 (1963).

-1209 U.S. 123 (1908).
42371 U.S. 415 (1963).
43 See id. at 447-48 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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ing common-law barratry, as it was indeed authorized to do.44 Plaintiffs
could then counter that these explanations merely disguise the Committee's
real purpose to continue to abridge their freedom of speech. Although an
inquiry into the motives of the legislators would be unprecedented, if not
improper, recent cases have invalidated state action that posed a serious
threat to the exercise of first amendment rights 4 5 The Supreme Court
has stated that legislative investigatory power is not unlimited 48 but must
be balanced against individual rights when legislative inquiry infringes
activity protected by the first amendment.4 7 Although the interests of the
legislature have prevailed in prior cases 4 8 and the balancing approach has
usually been confined to contempt enforcement proceedings, the Court's
recent concern with threats to free speech might sanction an injunction
against legislative activities that, regardless of motivation, were accomplishing the very purposes declared unconstitutional in Button."
Plaintiffs' prayer for an injunction in the present case contained
allegations that members of the Committee had "'urged and asked' plaintiffs' clients to 'abandon' them, and that defendants 'did further state, publish and cause to be published statements and papers' pointing out plaintiffs
as violators of the laws." 50 In general, legislative overreaching has been
curtailed by judicial refusal to enforce committee orders.5 1 This has
alleviated the impairment of individual freedom which judicial reluctance
to enjoin investigations might otherwise have allowed. In the present
case, however, plaintiffs' alleged substantial injuries have been caused by
committee action that will never require judicial enforcement to be effective. Moreover, the original Civil Rights Acts were enacted to provide
access to federal courts not only when states were enforcing openly discriminatory legislation, but also when state judicial and political agencies
were unwilling or unable to protect individual constitutional rights. 2 The
44
VA. CoDE ANN. § 30-42(a) (Supp. 1962) empowers the committee to "direct
its attention to the observance . . .of those laws, whether statutory or common law,
relating to champerty, maintenance, barratry, running and capping and other offenses
of any other nature relating to the promotion or support of litigation by persons who
are not parties thereto." But cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
45 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) ; NAACP v. Button,
supra note 44; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) ; cf. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
46
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957); United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953) (dictum).
47 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 126 (1959) ; United States v. Rumely,
345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953). See generally Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
49 Cf. United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960) (federal court has jurisdiction to enjoin state as party defendant from interfering with individual voting

rights).

50
Instant
51

case at 132.
Neither a federal nor a state court could constitutionally enforce a legislative
contempt order that violated the defendant's constitutional rights. Cf. Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (tracing legislative history of original
civil rights acts).
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underlying congressional concern could as well have embraced protection
of Negroes whom a legislative committee had singled out for harassment 11
which threatened the exercise of their rights to free speech and advocacy.
Because their constitutional rights--equal protection and free speech-may
be seriously threatened by the court's dismissal of their suit for injunctive
relief, and because precedent does not preclude an injunction against a
state legislative committee, the district court should be directed to reach
54
the merits.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SuPREME COURT

DECLINES To CoNSIDER WHETHER DUE PROCESS REQUimES IMPARTIAL GRAND JURIES
ON RECORD PRESENTING SPECULATIVE EVIDENCE op BIAS

Acting upon information uncovered by the McClellan Committee's
labor racketeering hearings of 1957, the State of Washington convened a
special grand jury to investigate David D. Beck. After the return of an
indictment charging grand larceny, Beck moved to dismiss the bill on the
ground that the impaneling judge had failed to examine the prospective
grand jurors to ascertain whether any of them was biased against him.'
The motion was denied without opinion, and Beck was convicted of the
offense. The conviction was upheld by an equally divided Washington
Supreme Court, the four affirming justices holding that an impartial grand
jury was not required by either due process or Washington law. 2 On
certiorari,3 the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no substantial evidence of actual prejudice had been shown; 4 however, it would not "re-a Six other states have barratry statutes similar to the Virginia act, which could
probably be enforced as in the instant case. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
445-46 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
54 On remand, plaintiffs would probably seek to amend their complaint to challenge the constitutionality of the statute establishing the Committee as applied to
them. Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). See generally 110
U. PA. L. REv. 1162 (1962). If amendment were permitted under FED. R. Civ. P.
15(a), trial on the merits would require a three-judge district court. 28 U.S.C.
§§2281, 2284 (1958).
I "No prospective grand juror was asked if he was prejudiced against Beck, and
only three were asked if they were conscious of bias or prejudice of any kind. Two
of these were excused." Instant case at 565 n.8 (dissenting opinion).
2 State v. Beck, 56 Wash. 2d 474, 480, 349 P.2d 387, 390, afirmance upheld on
rehearing, 56 Wash. 2d 474, 537, 353 P.2d 429 (1960).
3365 U.S. 866 (1961). The Court's refusal to consider Beck's second equal
protection contention, see note 6 infra, was based partly on its exclusion from this
limited writ.
4 Beck's evidence of bias consisted primarily of newspaper and magazine publicity
in which his guilt was presupposed. He also relied on the impaneling judge's failure
to instruct the grand jurors to disregard press statements, Beck's repeated invocation
of the fifth amendment before the McClellan Committee, and the statement of Senator
McClellan that he believed Beck had "committed many criminal offenses." See
instant case at 542-45. Beck's own statement of the question presented was whether
he had a right to have the grand jury impaneled "in a manner which would prevent
or at least tend to prevent the selection of biased and prejudiced grand jurors." 365
U.S. 866, 867 (1961).
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motely intimate any view" on the validity of petitioner's premise that an
5
unprejudiced grand jury was required by the due process clause. Beck
v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962). 6
The asserted right to an unprejudiced grand jury was based primarily
upon the Court's statement of the issue in Cassell v. Texas: "Review was
sought in this case to determine whether there had been a violation by
Texas of petitioner's federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial
5 See instant case at 546; Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 398 (1962).

Mr.

Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that whenever there is unfairness in any part of
a criminal proceeding due process is violated. Instant case at 581. Mr. Justice
Black dissented on the ground that although the Court did not have to decide whether
an unprejudiced grand jury is constitutionally required, the law of the State of Washington does guarantee such a safeguard, so that the state's failure to provide an
unbiased body in the instant case singled Beck out and denied him the equal protection of state law. Instant case at 563.
6 Beck had also contended that he had been denied the equal protection of Washington law. He claimed, first, that he had been singled out because the state supreme
court failed to follow prior cases allegedly guaranteeing all defendants an impartial
grand jury, even though-due to the equal division-the earlier cases would still be
Washington law. See instant case at 554-55. Beck, however, failed to prove that
an impartial grand jury had always been required in the past. Instant case at 554.
The state code grants a challenge for prejudice only to defendants in custody or held
to answer at the time of impaneling. WASH. Rw. CODE ANN. § 10.28.030 (1961).
Although the code does not have a provision allowing other defendants to object
to grand jury prejudice after indictment, the state supreme court, seizing upon provisions granting a motion to dismiss an indictment returned against a defendant not
previously held to answer on the ground that the grand jury was not properly impaneled and drawn-WAsH. Rrv. CODE ANN. §§ 10.40.070(4), 10.40.075 (1961); see
State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 284, 289-90, 144 Pac. 32, 34
(1914)-has intimated that the protection afforded by § 10.28.030 might apply to
defendants not yet held to answer, through the device of a voir dire examination
conducted by the impaneling judge. See State v. Guthrie, 185 Wash. 464, 474-75,
56 P.2d 160, 164 (1936); State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, supra at 286,
144 Pac. at 32-33. See generally Note, Some Observations on the Beck Case, 36
WASH. L. REv. 134, 141, 143-44 (1961). These dicta were ignored by the four
affirming justices below, see 56 Wash. 2d 474, 349 P.2d 387, and were narrowly construed by the Supreme Court, which rested on the fact that no prior holding had
required an impartial grand jury in all cases. Instant case at 554 & n.5. Four months
before the Supreme Court's decision in the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court
again affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground of
prejudice among the grand jurors. State v. Bell, 59 Wash. 2d 338, 368 P.2d 177,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962). In the course of its discussion, however, the court
laid down a standard for the application of § 10.28.030 that would clearly have encompassed Beck. Compare id. at 353, 368 P.2d at 187 (dictum), with Judge Donworth's dissenting opinion in Beck, 56 Wash. 2d 527-28, 349 P.2d at 417-18. The
Bell rule might be distinguishable since in that case certain named grand jurors were
alleged to have expressed preconceived opinions, whereas in Beck the gravamen of
the claim was that the impaneling judge failed to ascertain whether any of the prospective grand jurors were prejudiced. See note 4 supra. But since Bell, which was a
unanimous opinion concurred in by all four of the justices who had voted to affirm
in Beck, cited no prior authority and indicated an intent to adopt a broad construction
of § 1028.030, it follows that Beck-if not a denial of equal protection, see instant
case at 554-55-was apparently an aberration of Washington grand jury law.
Beck's reliance on the Murphy and Guthrie dicta, see instant case at 573 (dissenting opinion), also accounted for his failure to contend seriously in the Washington
courts that a restriction of § 10.28.030 to persons in custody or held to answer f6r
an offense was unconstitutional. See instant case at 549-54. This was the second
equal protection contention argued by Beck, but the Supreme Court held that it had
been raised too late. Ibid. Had the claim been argued in Beck's rehearing petition
to the state supreme court, the Court might have considered it, because the affirming
justices' decision was a marked departure from the earlier dicta. See instant case
at 553; Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 447 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting);
Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313, 320 (1930). See generally RoarsoN & KiRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT, § 76 (Wolfson & Kurland ed. 1951).
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grand jury." 7 Cassell marked the culmination of the development, in a
long line of racial discrimination cases, of a rule that "a Negro is denied
the equal protection of the laws when he is indicted by a grand jury from
which Negroes as a race have been intentionally excluded." s This principle is not applicable by analogy to the "impartiality" question in the instant case. Systematic discrimination against the race is the sole issue in
the Negro cases, and there is no inquiry as to the state of mind of the
grand jurors concerning the defendant. Mr. Justice Douglas' interpretation of Cassell as insuring impartiality towards the defendant 9 overlooks
the fact that it is the manner of selection-as opposed to the mental
attitude of those selected-that violates the equal protection rule
enunciated in Cassell.10 Exclusion of Negroes from the panels is not
indicative of the mental attitude of the white persons actually selected, and
the Court has never held that a defendant has a vested right to representation of his race."
The majority opinion expressly disclaimed any intimation on whether
due process requires impartiality vis-A-vis the defendant, but did cite
dicta in three recent cases to show that a colorable argument to this
effect might be made.12 But until the Court either adopts Justice Douglas'
position and extends the meaning of "impartiality" beyond protection of
minority groups, or reverts to a viewpoint that has been criticized in the
past half century-that the function of the grand jury is to stand between
the prosecutor and the accused-, 3 due process does not seem to require
that grand jurors be completely impartial toward prospective defendants. 14
Whatever the grand jury's historic justification, its contemporary
function in criminal law administration suggests no compelling reason why
7 See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ; Brief for Petitioner, p. 40, instant
case.
SE.g., Cassell v. Texas, supra note 7, at 283; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
9 See instant case at 579-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
10 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
11 See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 295 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
121nstant case at 546. The three cases cited were Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339, 349-50 (1958); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956);
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485 (1951). In Lawn, the Court said "an
indictment returned by a legally constituted non-biased grand jury . . . is enough
to call for a trial of the charge on the merits." Costello cited Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939), which was a racial discrimination case in which the word
"non-biased" was not even mentioned, and Hoffiman referred back to Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906), which discussed the function of the grand jury under the "ancient
English system," the contemporary relevance of which is considered infra at note 19.
3 See note 19 infra.
14 The majority allowed to go unanswered a question posed by Mr. justice Douglas
that would have forced the Court to carry its position to the extreme: "Could we
possibly sustain a conviction obtained in either a state or federal court where the
grand jury that brought the charge was composed of the accused's political enemies?"
Instant case at 581 (dissenting opinion). A partial answer, derived from the holding
in the instant case itself, is that the Court will not begin to consider whether there
is a limitation upon the rule that prejudice of the grand jurors is irrelevant until
the defendant establishes by substantial evidence that some degree of actual prejudice
exists. See United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710, 717-18 (S.D. Fla. 1962). Thus
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impartiality should be required. Historically the grand jury has been
charged with the twofold responsibility of bringing the guilty to trial
while protecting the innocent from unfounded prosecution. 15 These functions developed from its twin roles at its inception in the common law: to
punish in the King's courts criminals not properly dealt with by the local
barons, 6 and to exonerate arrested persons whose possible guilt could
not be adequately demonstrated and who otherwise would languish in
prison until the next yearly assize.17 Use of the information's and the
refinement of constitutional safeguards '9 have to a large extent supplanted
these historic responsibilities in modern times.
A realistic argument against a general due process requirement of
impartiality by the modern investigating body is that the identity of the
accused is often unknown at the time the grand jury is convened.2 0 In
addition, a modern district attorney driven by a desire to prosecute a
particular person can proceed by information, circumventing the protection
of the grand jury.2 ' Moreover, the common law has always relied prithe Court has not yet faced Justice Douglas' question, which is whether there is a
point in the continuum ranging from tentatively preconceived opinions to passionate
hatred, beyond which an indictment returned by such a grand jury is invalid. A
few state and lower federal courts have attempted to articulate some limitation to
the rule that prejudice of the grand jurors is immaterial. E.g., Quinn v. United
States, 203 F.2d 20, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion), rev'd on other
grounds, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) ("fear induced by an atmosphere of intimidation");
State ex rel. Reichert v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 139-40, 73 N.E.2d 174, 178 (1947)
("I know how I got on the Grand Jury. We are going to get the Mayor."). But
see Smyth v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 283, 301 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ("active malice"
of a juror Would not constitute a ground for quashing the indictment). The extent
to which the suggested limitations are based on a due process ground is unclear. See
Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 571, 166 At. 45, 50 (1933) (dictum).
15 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61-62 (1906) ; Field's Charge, 30 Fed.
Cas. 992, 993 (No. 18255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872).
16 See Hale v. Henkel, supra note 15, at 59; CRoss & JoNEs, CRIMIALm
LAW 28
(2d ed. 1949).
137See 56 Wash. 2d at 481, 349 P.2d at 390.
18 At common law an indictment was a condition precedent to prosecution for a
felony, but a state may prosecute even a capital offense by information, though the
federal government cannot. See, e.g., Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 86-87
(1928) ; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
19 The effect of one of the principal modern safeguards, the constitutional right
to a speedy trial, is discussed in 4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE § 1732,
at 519-20 (Anderson ed. 1957). Released from the responsibility of rescuing obviously
innocent persons from prison, the grand jury is used today almost exclusively for
investigatory purposes. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1933). Since investigators are not called upon to weigh evidence so much as
to ferret out crime, the old arguments voiced in such cases as Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 59 (1906), that a "most valuable function of the grand jury [is] . . . to
stand between the prosecutor and the accused" have lost much of their persuasiveness.
See 2 FREUND, SUTHERLAND, HOWE & BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 980 (1954).
20 See State v. Bell, 59 Wash. 2d 338, 353, 368 P.2d 177, 187 (1962) ; State v.
Beck,
56 Wash. 2d 474, 479-80, 349 P.2d 387, 390 (1960).
21
In Washington, for example, it has long been settled that an information is
a sufficient cause to warrant subjecting the defendant to trial if the prosecutor swears
that its contents were known by him to be true. State v. Cronin, 20 Wash. 512, 56
Pac. 26 (1899) ; State v. Regan, 8 Wash. 506, 36 Pac. 472 (1894).
See generally
4 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 19, §§ 1755-56, at 544-47. Significantly, information
may be a less potent weapon for the prosecution than indictment since the stigma
of suspicion which often attaches to an indictment does not follow from the prose-
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marily upon a fair trial to protect the liberty of an innocent defendant,
22

utilizing the grand jury as an accusatory rather than adjudicating device.
On a practical level, neither possible method of reviewing grand jury
motives-interlocutory or post-conviction proceedings-would be satisfactory. The former would be dilatory and would deprive the grand jury
of the essential cloak of secrecy that is as venerable as the institution itself.m The latter alternative would come too late to save an innocent
person from the ordeal of a trial, and would be manifestly unnecessary in
the case of a guilty one.24 Although Washington seems to require that
grand jurors be impartial when the identity of the suspect can be reasonably ascertained at the time the investigation is begun,25 the serious difficulties in the application of even such a limited rule should discourage the
promulgation of a general constitutional requirement of impartiality in all
grand jury proceedings. To require impartiality when the defendant's

identity is known prior to the grand jury proceeding necessitates the
retrospective determination of whether the identity of a defendant had
been sufficiently ascertained, 26 and whether, in the case of defendants falling under the rule, the steps taken by the impaneling judge to assure
impartiality were adequate.2 7 But to enforce impartiality in all grand
jury proceedings would cause the dismissal of indictments on the
fortuitous discovery of bias 28 and waste a costly and time-consuming investigation 2 9 when there is no way to discover the latent bias beforehand.
cutor's accusation by information. Cf. Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 567, 166 At.
45, 49 (1933) (mere fact of investigation would, if made public, cause the subject
to be held in "disrepute," even if the grand jury returned no bill). But see Cassell
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (indictment gives rise
to no presumption of guilt).
22"The grand jury does not try; it merely accuses with a view to trial."
United
States v. Belvin, 46 Fed. 381, 384 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1891); People v. Looney, 314 Ill.
150, 155, 145 N.E. 365, 367 (1924); State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423, 267 N.W. 65
(1936). But see Vanhook v. State, 12 Tex. 252, 268 (1854) : "It is the right of the
accused to have the question of his guilt decided by two competent juries, before
he is condemned to punishment."
23See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ; 4 WHARTON,
op. cit. supra note 19, § 1720, at 492.
24 Cf. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
25 Since the grand jury in the instant case had been convened primarily for the
purpose of investigating Beck, he argued that he had been denied the equal protection
of Washington law. See note 6 supra.
26This was the stumbling block which the defendant failed to surmount in
State v. Bell, 59 Wash. 2d 338, 353, 368 P.2d 177, 187 (1962).
27As an example of the subtleties involved in making such a determination,
consider the Court's review of the impaneling judge's charge and voir dire of the
grand jurors investigating Beck. Instant case at 546-48.
28 Compare the consequences of the failure to produce "specific" evidence of bias
in United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710, 717 (S.D. Fla. 1962) and in the instant
case with the effect of the fortuitous remark made by one of the grand jurors in
State ex rel. Reichert v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 139-40, 73 N.E2d 174, 178 (1947),
quoted at note 14 supra.
29 Conceivably, the grand jurors could be re-screened for bias each time the
direction of the investigation turns, but as to this alternative the affirming judges in
the court below in the instant case replied:
When a modem grand jury starts its investigative process it seems ridiculous
to suggest that as each new personality comes under scrutiny the proceed-
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The practical considerations which preclude the requirement of an impartial grand jury and the presence of other safeguards which make it
unnecessary have long been recognized by the vast majority of state and
lower federal judges. 0

CORPORATIONS-Bu-YR's
RIESIGNATIOI

RECTORS

OPTIoN

To

REQUIRE

AND REPLACEFENT OF MA"ORITY

SERIATIM

OF BoARD

OF

Di-

ACCOMPANYING PURCHASE OF CONTROLLING STOCK HELD

NOT ILLEGAL PER SE UNDER NEW YORK LAW

Defendant contracted in New York to sell to plaintiff 566,223 shares,
or 28.3 percent of the common stock of Republic Pictures Corporation.'
The agreement contained a clause giving the purchaser an option to
require a majority of Republic's existing directors to replace themselves,
by a process of seriatim resignation, with a majority designated by the
purchaser.2 Plaintiff gave the required notice of election to exercise the
option and made valid tender at closing, but defendant refused to perform.
In the buyer's damage suit, removed to the Southern District of New
York under diversity jurisdiction, summary judgment was granted for the
seller on the ground that the contract was void because against public
policy. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that, since such a provision
does not render a contract illegal per se under New York law, summary
judgment was improper. Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572
(2d Cir. 1962).'
ings must stop until it can be determined whether any member of the grand
jury is biased or prejudiced against him; and, if a grand juror is so biased
or prejudiced, the investigation is at an end.
56 Wash. 2d at 479-80, 349 P.2d at 390.
30 See cases cited notes 22-23 mspra, and In re Kittle, 180 Fed. 946, 947 (C.C.
S.D.N.Y. 1910) (L. Hand, J.).
1 The price was $8.00 per share, $2.00 per share above the then market price on
the New York Stock Exchange. Plaintiff claimed that at the time of closing the
stock was worth more than $12.75 per share. The stock has since been sold to
another party at $10.00 per share.
2This is a familiar plan for changing stock control. See Hill, The Sale of
Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REv. 986, 993 (1957); cf. Oil Shares, Inc. v. Kahn,
94 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1938) (dictum). Corporate statutes commonly provide that
a vacancy on the board of directors may be filled by the remaining members. See
2 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoRPoRATIoNs § 286 (perm. ed. rev. 1954) ; Leech, Transactiots
in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 725, 782 n.163 (1956). But see Investment
Company Act of 1940, § 16(a), 54 Stat. 813, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1958).
3The court quickly disposed of appellant's contention that the clause was
severable:
[T]he most elementary application of the parol evidence rule forbids us to
entertain Essex' argument that there is a factual issue as to whether the
transfer clause was central to the negotiations or only an afterthought.
On the face of the contract the sale of stock and the transfer of director
control are but two aspects of a single transaction; the provision for the
latter in paragraph 6 states that it is to be "a condition to the closing of
this transaction." A matter so practically important as achieving imme-
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The law concerning restrictions on the transfer of controlling stock
is in a state of confusion and flux. In New York it is clear that sale of
corporate office or management control unaccompanied by transfer of
shares is illegal.4 If less than a controlling stock interest 5 is transferred,
an accompanying agreement to replace officers or directors is also unenforceable. 6 However, in Barnes v. Brown,7 the New York Court of
Appeals held that a plan for immediate transfer of management control did
not make a contract for the sale of a majority stock interest illegal; 8 the
theory was that the purchaser, having obtained the right to control, should
be able to secure that control at once. 9 Nothing in subsequent New York
decisions seems to have impaired this holding, and the rationale of
accelerating the acquisition of control applies equally to the situation in
which the controlling block is not an actual majority of shares. This
reasoning is in harmony with statements in New York cases that the seller
of a controlling block of shares is entitled to derive some premium
attributable to "block value." '0 Since the New York lower courts have
diate . . . control over the day-to-day operations of the corporation in which
Essex was making such a substantial investment cannot be dismissed as a
mere "incidental provision."
Instant case at 574.
4 McClure v. Law, 161 N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899); Watkins v. Passannante,
114 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
5 Controlling interest is best defined as the ownership of a block of voting stocknot necessarily a majority-sufficient to give one the capacity.to choose directors
and to formulate policy. See text accompanying notes 26-28 infra; Berle, "Control"
in CorporateLaw, 58 CoLum. L. Rav. 1212, 1213 (1958).
IsLockley v. Robie, 276 App. Div. 291, 94 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1950); Fabre v.
O'Donahue, 185 App. Div. 779 (1918); Fennessy v. Ross, 90 Hun. 298, 35 N.Y.
Supp. 868 (Sup. Ct. 1895); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234
(1934) (alternative holding).
780 N.Y. 527 (1880).
SAlthough there was no term in the contract which required the seller to
effectuate the immediate replacement of directors, the court found that "it was the
understanding and a part of the scheme that he should do so." Id. at 536.
9 Id. at 537. In the instant case, had the deal gone through, Essex could not
have obtained control in the form of a majority of the board of directors, in the
normal course of events, until some eighteen months after the sale of the stock.
Instant case at 575-576. In San Remo Copper Mining Co. v. Moneuse, 149 App.
Div. 26, 133 N.Y. Supp. 509 (1912), the court stated that "It certainly did not
destroy the validity . . . [that the purchaser was] to be invested with this power
of control at once, . . . instead of waiting for the next annual meeting." Id. at 28,
133 N.Y. Supp. at 511 (alternative holding) (majority of stock acquired); accord,
Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Conn. 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Roosevelt v.
Hamblin, 199 Mass. 127, 85 N.E. 98 (1908).
0
1 In Stanton v. Schenck, 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1931),
the court reasoned that:
As such a holder [of a large block of stock] he might be in a position
to command a considerable premium above current prices in a favorable
market. The advantage would be entirely his, for which he would in no
way be compelled to respond to the corporation. If it is granted that a
director may freely sell his own stock, it must follow that he may benefit
from the advantage due to his holding of an exceptionally large block of
stock.
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recognized that "control might have lawful advantages," 11 the provision
here challenged could not be unlawful per se.12 The present holding correctly applies the existing New York law.
However, an increasing number of courts have held sellers of controlling shares liable if the corporation sustains losses or if excessive
profits are realized from the transaction.' 3 These cases have involved
either looting, grossly excessive price, or loss of specific corporate opportunities-factual determinations made after the contract has been performed-, but they indicate a definite trend toward strict judicial scrutiny
of control transactions. This development reflects in part a growing
intellectual acceptance of the "corporate asset" theory: that control is an
asset of the corporation, held by the controlling shareholders in trust for
the corporation, which cannot lawfully be appropriated for private gain.' 4
Extended to its logical extreme, this approach would outlaw all agreements
to replace corporate officers, except those accompanying a transfer of substantially all of the outstanding shares.
The authors of two recent and thorough studies of the law of trading
in corporate control contend, each for slightly different reasons, that a
corporate insider should not be permitted to sell his shares on terms unavailable to noncontrolling shareholders.' 5 Although neither Jennings nor
140 Misc. at 633, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 233. This theory was reiterated in Levy v.
American Beverage Corp., 265 App. Div. 208, 218, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 (1942)
(Emphasis added.) :
Nor would the fact that purchasers were willing to pay a larger price to
one holding control necessarily make the receipt of an increased price improper or indicate any unlawful intention on the part of the purchasers.
Control might have lawful advantages. For instance, if corporate control
for the purpose of merger, or some similar object, was desired by the purchasers for legitimate purposes, undoubtedly they would pay more for a
controlling interest.
But see Leech, supra note 2, at 792-93, 818-20.
"2Levy v. American Beverage Corp., supra note 10, at 218, -38 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
12 This is confirmed by dictum in Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622, 652
(Sup. Ct. 1941):
The statement in 3 Cook on Corporations, 8th ed., section 622a, that
"a contract by which the directors who own a majority of the stock sell such
stock and agree to substitute the vendees as directors of the company is
legal," may be literally correct, but it must be read subject to many limitations ....

In Posen v. Thompson-Starrett Co., 20 Misc. 2d 537, 194 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct.
1959), a counterclaim based upon excess of purchase price of controlling shares
over market price was sustained against a motion for summary judgment.
13 See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 952 (1955); Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 42 F. Supp. 126
(E.D. Pa. 1941); Gerdes v. Reynolds, supra note 12; Porter v. Healy, 244 Pa. 427,
91 Atl. 428 (1914); Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410,
76 Atl. 77 (1910).
14 See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 244
(1932). For Berle's approach to the problem of the instant case, see Berle, "Controt" in Corporate Law, 58 Corum. L. Rhv. 1212 (1958). The court regards this
theory as the basis of its decision in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). Instant case at 576.
'5 Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1956); Leech,
supra note 2. But see Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv.

986 (1957).
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Leech fully accepts the corporate asset theory, both deny that the right to
a special profit accompanies the ownership of controlling shares. Professor
Leech suggests that the question of enforcement of such contracts should
be considered against the background of policies of accountability of the
parties. 16 Since the process of seriatim resignations could easily lead to
personal profit and abuse of corporate rights, accountability may be an
inadequate sanction and refusal to enforce sale of control agreements a
better one. Thus Leech recommends repeal of statutory provisions which
permit directors to fill vacancies on the board indiscriminately, and substitution of provisions comparable to those of the Investment Company Act
17
of 1940, which prohibits this process in investment companies.
However, such a prophylactic rule as illegality per se would prevent
a substantial number of innocent transactions, in which the buyer's interest
in acquiring immediate control is not based upon prospects of illegal conversion of corporate assets.' 8 The purchaser might justifiably believe that
a quick installation of new management will improve the corporation's
earning power through the employment of new practices or the exploitation of new marketing opportunities. The price paid for the controlling block might reflect this optimism. 19 Professor Hill adds that
immediate transfer of control also avoids the "lame-duck" situation on the
board of directors, in which persons without a proprietary interest in the
corporation might lack responsibility in the exercise of control.20 In the
present case, Judge Lumbard contends that a policy of immediate transfer
of corporate control "is ordinarily beneficial to the economy" insofar as it
encourages free marketability of corporations, 2 1 whereas Judge Friendly
suggests that present sanctions against abuse of corporate rights are
inadequate. 22
The effect that the corporate asset theory and the policy arguments
of the commentators might have upon the New York courts is speculative.
A New York Supreme Court opinion in Benson v. Braun 2 contains lan16 Leech, supra note 2, at 788 n.181. All the commentators seem to agree that
the wise businessman, whether or not required to by law, should insist that the
buyers make the same offer-at the same price and terms-to minority stockholders
as well. Cf. CHOKA, BUYING, SELLING, AND MERGING BUSINESSES 113 (1958).
'7 Leech, supra note 2, at 809. The author rejects the theory that there should
be some lawfully saleable elements of control. Adequate standards do not exist,
he argues, for segregating the price paid for (1) intrinsic value, (2) legitimate
advantages, and (3) illegal aspects of control. Leech would take into account only
the economy of purchasing shares in a block, id. at 819-20, but larger blocks are
generally more difficult to market.
IsSee Hill, supra note 2, at 988, 991, 1007-09, 1027, 1038-39.
19 Jennings defines "investment value" or "intrinsic value" as "capitalization of
the estimated future return to be expected from the stock on the basis of presently
available data . . . . the value which would be attributed to the stock on a hypothetical, well-informed market." Jennings, supra note 15, at 1 n2. If "data" is read
to include reasonable expectations of returns from new policies, some higher prices
would be justified within this definition.
20 Hill, supra note 2, at 996.
21 Instant case at 578.
22
23

Instant case at 581.
Benson v. Braun, 8 Misc. 2d 67, 155 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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guage implying a rejection of the earlier doctrines permitting bargaining
for resignations accompanying sale of control:
The evidence does not establish that the matter of resignations
was the subject of negotiation or agreement. That the purchasers . . . expected such resignations to occur appears highly
probable .

.

.

. Such expectations or assumptions cannot be

equated with the bartering of offices which the law forbids. The
question then becomes one of determining whether the price paid
for the stock is so great that it can be explained in no other
way than as a payment for resigning from office.24
Judge Lumbard explains this as relevant only as an indication of "whether
the sellers had any reason for suspecting that the purchasers had improper
intentions in acquiring control." 25 But the Benson court clearly separated
the theory of negligent failure to foresee looting possibilities from that of
excessive price indicating illegal sale of office. Thus Judge Lumbard's interpretation, although tenable, seems incorrect. The Benson case dealt with
after-the-fact determination of accountability, and its dictum is not an
authoritative indication of a change in the existing law of enforceability,
although it may foreshadow future modifications. Judges Lumbard and
Clark believed that such change was not forthcoming; Judge Friendly,
concurring, faced the difficult problem of the extent to which a federal
court should attempt to foresee changes in the state law by which it is
bound.26 He concluded that the federal court's prediction of the decision
of state courts must be made "on the basis of legal materials rather than
personal acquaintance or hunch."

27

24 Id. at 71, 155 N.Y.S.2d at 627. The court held that the burden of proving
that the excess received for the controlling stock was payment for resignations and
election of buyer's nominees was not sustained by the evidence. There is also dictum
in the early case of Bosworth v. Allen, 168 N.Y. 157, 166, 61 N.E. 163, 165 (1901),
which implies that controlling shareholders who sell out are liable to account for
their gains as well as for damages "naturally resulting" from their acts. In that
case there was both sale of controlling stock and looting, so that the ultimate question remains unanswered: would they be liable for their gains absent the damages
to the corporation.
25 Instant case at 578.
26 The outcome of a diversity case in a federal court should be substantially the
same as it would be if tried in a state court. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945) ; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The rule presents serious
problems when there are no clearly controlling state decisions, or when the state
law is developing and changing. To compel the federal judge to guess at state
court outcome may seriously limit his judicial role; nor is there any set formula by
which later conflicts with state law can be minimized. See generally Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 208-212 (1956) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring) ; Nolan
v. Transocean Air Lines, 290 F.2d 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 901 (1961),
110 U. PA. L. R-v. 602 (1962) ; Alford v. Noonan, 259 F.2d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1958) ;
Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945); Carroll v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 141 F. Supp. 456, 457 (D. Mass. 1956); Smith v. Pennsylvania Central
Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940, 942 (D.D.C. 1948); HART & WMcHSI.ER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEm 628-630 (1953); Note, Inter-jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111
U. PA. L. R1v. 344 (1963).
27 Instant case at 582.
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Although in agreement on the narrow holding, the three judges
divided in dicta as to the tests of legality to be applied on remand; here
there was no clear state authority to guide the court's reasoning. Judge
Lumbard would rest the legality of the provision upon a factual determination of whether the purchaser would be practically certain to have acquired
the equivalent of majority stock control or "working control," placing the
burden of proof upon the seller. Judge Clark maintained that such a
factual determination should not affect the outcome, since 28.3 percent
clearly amounts to working control of a large public issue corporation,
barring the circumstance of a pitched proxy battle, which the court could
not possibly foresee. Judge Friendly, concurring, also dissented from
Judge Lumbard's factual test. He pointed out that distinctions between
varying degrees of effectiveness of control bear little relation to the relevant policy considerations; that in most instances a seller will not contract
to deliver a majority of directorships unless he has good reason to think
that he can; and that the test of practical certainty of working control has
inherent difficulties in application, involving the valuation of voluminous
28
evidence concerning both intentions and probabilities.
Thus, the majority view is that additional factual considerations as to
degree of control should not affect the legality of the clause in question.
The undisputed facts in the present case clearly justify a finding of control
without further inquiry: Republic Pictures Corporation had 2,004,190
shares of common stock outstanding, traded on the New York Stock
Exchange, of which seller held 566,223; a majority of the board had been
following the seller's policies by virtue of his stock holding and his position
as President and Chairman of the Board, and there was no indication that
they would not similarily follow successors to his interest; there was no
other large minority block which might provide opposition; there was no
allegation that outsiders had been attempting to buy into the company to
gain control; the apparent reason for refusal to perform the contract was
not inability to obtain the resignations but a rise in the market price of
the stock.
Although 28.3 percent is clearly working control in the present context, lesser percentages or different circumstances in future cases will
produce borderline situations. If resignation clauses are not to be held
illegal per se, factual inquiry beyond a finding of working control will be
necessary, hopefully channelled by the policies which underlie restrictions
on control transactions. Most important would be a determination
whether the corporation was peculiarly susceptible to looting,30 mismanage28 Ibid.
29 Section 2(a) (9) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 791, 15
U.S.C. § 80(a)-2(a) (9) (1958), states that any person who owns 25% of voting
stock shall "be presumed to control" the company. Judge Lumbard states that "it is
commonly known that equivalent power usually accrues to the owner of 28.3% of the
stock." Instant case at 575. See generally Berle, supra note 5, at 1216; Hill, supra
note 2, at 997-99.
30 For example, a corporation holding large amounts of cash, securities, or
other liquid assets.
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ment, or misappropriation of corporate assets. Other factors might be
excessiveness of price, hostility between controlling and other shareholders,
the period of time before the next stockholders' meeting, and the existence
of corporate marketing opportunities which could easily be monopolized
by purchaser's other business interests.8 1 Finally, even where breach of
a contract for the sale of control properly grounds recovery of damages,
courts should be slow to grant specific performance. Whereas damage
liability affects only the parties to the contract, the enforcement remedy
may injure the corporation.

FEDERAL COURTS-DISTRICT CoURT HAS No JURISDICTION
OVER NEGLIGENCE ACTION BY THE UNITED STATES AGAINST A STATE
ABSENT STATE'S WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The United States sued California in a federal district court for damages allegedly resulting from the negligence of state employees in starting
and failing to extinguish a fire in a national forest. It claimed the court
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345,1 which grants the district courts
jurisdiction in all actions in which the United States is plaintiff. Under
California law, the state is immune from suits for negligence in the performance of governmental activities. The court on its own motion 2 dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. United States v. California,208
F. Supp. 861 (S.D. Cal.), appeal docketed, No. 18246, 9th Cir., Oct.
3, 1962.
Although the United States may sue private parties in a federal district court to recover for tortious damage to government property, it has
never before sought to bring such an action against a state. It has sued
states without their consent in a district court to quiet title to land,4 to
condemn land,5 and to protect the interests of Indian tribes,( but, unlike
ordinary tort actions, these are instances in which the supremacy of the
national government is necessarily asserted, and it can be said that the
states consented to these suits when they adopted -the Constitution. The

31 Cf. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955).
1 "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the

United
States .
2

.

.

."

28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1958).

.Although the opinion was vague on this point, see instant case at 862-63, the
motion to show cause why the action should not be dismissed was made by the
district judge. Letter From Stanley Mosk, Att'y Gen. of California, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 31, 1962; Letter From James R. Akers, Jr.,
Assistant U.S. Att'y, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct. 30, 1962.
3 See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
4 United States v. Washington, 233 F.2d 811 (9th Cir., 1956).
5 Minnesota v. United States, 125 F.2d 636 (8th Cir. 1942).

6United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926).
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Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Arizona,7 recognized this distinction by
holding that a state's consent is not required if the action has its roots in
the "paramount" provisions of the United States Constitution, whereas
it refused to decide whether the United States has a right to indemnity or
contribution from a state with which it is jointly responsible to a private
party for tortious conduct. The unresolved issue in Arizona, therefore,
was whether Congress, by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act,8 intended
not only to waive the immunity of the United States to suits by private
individuals, but also to make the state indirectly liable to private individuals by subjecting the state to suits for indemnity or contribution when
the state is jointly responsible with the United States. However, in City
of Newark v. United States,9 a case also arising under the Tort Claims
Act, the Third Circuit rejected the city's defense of sovereign immunity to
the federal government's counterclaim which alleged direct injury to the
United States rather than to a private party. The court declared that
sovereignty provides no defense when the United States sues a state,'0
since state consent to all suits by the United States is implicit in the
constitutional plan."' Other cases, in dicta, agree with Newark."
The court in the present case took a much different view, arguing
that by their ratification of the Constitution the states impliedly surrendered
only the powers necessary to ensure the effective operation of the federal
system, and that it is not apparent why state immunity from suit for
13
torts resulting from governmental activity must have been relinquished.
Although this line of reasoning seems also to preclude bringing such suits
as original actions in the Supreme Court, the court apparently conceded
that the constitutional provision granting the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over all actions between the United States and a state 14 could
not be limited to exclude actions for negligence. It refused, however, to
recognize a similar jurisdiction in the district courts even though the
Judicial Code, as amended in 1948, provides in section 1251(b) that the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over "all controversies between
the United States and a State" shall not be exclusive. 15 When this
section is read in conjunction with section 1345's grant to the district
7 214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1954).

8 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1958).
9 254 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1958).
10 Id. at 97.
112 Id. at 96.
1 E.g., United States v. Washington, 233 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1956) (action to
quiet title to land for Indian tribe); United States v. Newhard, 128 F. Supp. 805,
808-09 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (action to enforce a tax lien); California v. United States,
91 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1950) (cross-complaint by the United States). In
United States v. Washington, supra, Judge Mathes, who wrote the opinion in the
instant case, flatly denied the state's claim of sovereign immunity on the ground
that Congress had granted the district court jurisdiction by virtue of §§ 1251 and
1345. 233 F.2d at 813-14.
13 Instant case at 867.
14 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
15 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2) (1958).
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courts of jurisdiction over all civil actions commenced by the United
States, it seems to indicate that the district courts have jurisdiction over
actions such as the present case. The court rejected this construction,
relying on the elusive concept of surrendered sovereignty and the lack
of evidence that Congress intended section 1251 to broaden the scope of
section 1345, which had never been construed to permit the United States
to bring a suit like the present case in a district court. At least in the
absence of more explicit statutory language, the court held that the overriding consideration of state sovereign immunity prohibited it from assuming jurisdiction.:1
The theory of sovereign immunity to tort actions is based on the apparent anomaly of having a sovereign, through its courts, arrive at and
enforce a judgment against itself.17 In the present case, however, the
federal government is not suing in a California court, and it will be able to
enforce the judgment, since "the judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party .8...
From a practical standpoint the present decision's deference to
sovereign immunity does little to enhance state sovereignty. By restricting the federal government's ability to sue unwilling states in district courts
to suits involving uniquely federal rights, the court did not defeat the
federal government's claim, which can still be brought as an original
action in the Supreme Court.19 It could be argued that the decision
assures the state an impartial trial by a court of a status befitting litigation
between a state and the United States, 20 but whatever its persuasiveness
in 1789, this argument has little cogency today when a state is suable without consent in district courts on many federal claims. Moreover, it would
appear that a state, if it is to be sued by the United States for negligence,
would prefer that the case be tried in the more convenient and less costly
district court rather than in the Supreme Court.
16 The court expressed doubt whether Congress could constitutionally grant district courts jurisdiction over negligence actions by the United States against a
state absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. Instant case at 867.
17 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
In Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), Mr. Justice Holmes gives this analysis: "A
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Sovereign
immunity is also justified on the equally conceptualistic ground that "the King can
do no wrong." "The practical or policy justification of the immunity is avoidance
of undue judicial intervention in the affairs of government." Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immuity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HAv. L. REV. 1479, 1484 (1962). See generally
FORDHAm, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1006-09 (1949).
Practical considerations, of
course, have often led sovereigns to allow suits against themselves. HART &
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 317 (1953).
18 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. For instances in which inferior federal courts have
rendered judgments against states when the United States was a party to the controversy, see note 12 supra.
19 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
20 See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892); instant case at 863.
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This decision has unfortunate implications for the Supreme Court,
which is primarily an appellate court and is ill-suited to act as a trial court
in negligence actions.21 In the past it has refused jurisdiction if there was
an alternative forum in which the original action could be brought. 22 Still,
the court in the present case held that there is no other forum for negligence actions by the United States against a state. The decision, based on
vague notions of sovereign immunity and surrendered state sovereignty,
attempts to uphold the rights of the states in a manner which serves neither
the interests of the states nor those of the federal government, and is at
variance with the few cases that have considered the subject.

PRovIsIONs
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS-PRoCEDtm.A
THE MnLa R ACT HELD INAPPLICABLE TO CAPFHART BONDS

OF

Plaintiff lumber company furnished materials to a subcontractor on a
Capehart Act military housing project. When the subcontractor failed to
pay for materials, plaintiff gave timely notice of the default to the principal
contractor as prescribed by the Miller Act. However, he failed to give the
notice required by the contractor's payment bond to any two of the following: the principal, one of the obligees, or the sureties. This form of notice
was provided, pursuant to the Capehart Act, by the Federal Housing Administration with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.' The Court of
Appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the complaint because of the
failure to give dual notice. It reasoned that Congress had not intended
Capehart projects to be governed by the Miller Act since the Capehart Act
provided a system of private financing inconsistent with the concept of
"public buildings or public work" and authorized the Secretary of Defense
to prescribe the procedural as well as the substantive details of these
bonds. United States ex rel. Miles Lumber Co. v. Harrison& Grirnshaw
Constr. Co., 305 F.2d 363 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962).2
Section 1 of the Miller Act requires contractors on "any public building or public work" to furnish payment bonds for the benefit of material21 See Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court,
11 STAN. L. REv. 665, 695-96 (1959), which declares that incompetence in special
matters, high cost to litigants, and a disproportionate use of time make the Court
an inappropriate tribunal for many original actions. The note writer also contends
that the Court itself is aware of shortcomings inherent in requiring it to sit as a
trial court.
22 Id. at 699. There have been only 123 original actions brought in the Supreme
Court, and these have frequently been cases of great significance. Id. at 665-66.

1 FHA Bond Form No. 2452 CP (rev. 1957), cited in Stipulation as to Record
on Appeal, p. 11, Continental Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Robertson Lumber
Co., 305 F.2d 794 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962).
2
Accord, Continental Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Robertson Lumber Co.,
supra note 1.
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men,3 and section 2 requires subcontractors' materialmen to give notice of
default only to the principal contractor.4 The Supreme Court, in United
States ex rel. Noland Co. v. Irwin, broadly defined "public work" to in-

clude "any project of the character heretofore constructed or carried on
either directly by the public authority or with public aid, to serve the public
interest," 6 and held that the Miller Act applied to a library built with
federal funds for a private college. In Irwin, the Court abandoned its
earlier position that similar bonding requirements were applicable only
when title passed to the Government upon partial payment but not when
title remained in the contractor until after completion. 7
3 Section I of the Miller Act provides:
(a) Before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount, for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any public building or public work of the United
States is awarded to any person, such person shall furnish to the United
States the following bonds . . .
(1) A performance bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the
officer awarding such contract, and in such amount as he shall deem
adequate, for the protection of the United States.
(2) A payment bond with a surety or sureties satisfactory to such
officer for the protection of all persons supplying labor and material
in the prosecution of the work provided for in said contract for the
use of each such person.
49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §270a(a) (1958). The predecessor of the Miller
Act, the Heard Act, 28 Stat. 278 (1894), was passed in recognition of the commutty's "equitable obligation" to protect workmen, materialmen and suppliers who
are unable to enforce payment liens against government property. It required all
contractors on public works to provide a bond guaranteeing performance to the
United States and payment to the various materialmen. The Miller Act was
passed in order to remedy procedural difficulties hindering the application for this
protection. It provided for two bonds-a payment bond in favor of materialmen
and a performance bond for the protection of the United States. See generally 79
CONG. REc. 11702, 13382, 13383 (1935) (remarks of Representative Miller and
Senator Walsh).
449 STAT. 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §270b(a) (1958).
1 316 U.S. 23 (1942). The broad interpretation of the Miller Act in Irwin
is in harmony with the rule that the act is to be liberally construed to accomplish
its purposes, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 353 U.S. 210, 216
(1957) ; Fleisher Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. United States, 311 U.S. 15, 17 (1940),
and implies a recognition that, although the act was passed primarily to protect
materialmen who could not enforce liens on publicly owned property, the Government gains other benefits from this bonding requirement. These bonds effectively
secure from liens such privately owned but publicly supported services as hospitals
and libraries. Moreover, the sureties often expedite work on the project in order to
protect themselves against loss. See Haas, The Corporate Surety and Public Construction Bonds, 25 GEo. WAsH. L. Rnv. 206, 208 (1956). The court in the instant
case attempted to distinguish Irwin on the ground that the latter decision was based
on the language of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Although this is true,
there is no indication that the Irwin court intended the broad application of the
Miller Act to apply only to projects under NIRA.
6 United States ex rel. Noland Co. v. Irwin, 316 U.S. 23, 24 (1942), quoting
National Industrial Recovery Act § 202(c), 48 Stat. 195, 201 (1933).
7 Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Crane Co., 219 U.S. 24 (1910); United States v.
Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910). These cases concerned chattels
which the Government could easily accept or reject and so could be distinguished
from the instant case and Irwin, in which the projects involved were permanent
buildings. However, Maiatico Constr. Co. v. United States ex rel. Phelps, 79 F.2d 418
(D.C. Cir. 1935), had held earlier that a project identical to that in the Irwin case
was not a "public work" Nevertheless, Capehart projects would qualify as public
work even under this narrow test since title to all materials and work for which
progress payments have been made vests in the United States. Armed Services
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In order to obtain critically needed housing for military personnel,
Congress in 1955 passed the Capehart Act, which provides in effect, a
unique system of temporary private financing. 8 An amendment to this
act, passed in 1956, requires that:
Any such contract shall provide for the furnishing by the contractor of a performance bond and a payment bond with a surety
or sureties satisfactory to the Secretary of Defense, or his designee,
and the furnishing of such bonds shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with section 1 of [The Miller Act] .
. and no additional bonds shall be required under such section.
The court in the instant case reasoned that Congress included the bonding provision in the 1956 amendment in recognition of the fact that Capehart projects were not "public work" governed by the bonding provisions
of the Miller Act.'
However, not only are Capehart projects clearly
within the Supreme Court's broad definition of the scope of the Miller Act,
but their public purpose and the ultimate financial responsibility of the
Government certainly stamp them as "public work." 11 Nevertheless, there
are strong policy reasons why Capehart materialmen should be required to
Housing Contract, general provision 14(c), p. 20, cited in Stipulation as to Record
on Appeal, p. 16, Continental Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Robertson Lumber
Co., 305 F.2d 794 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962). The court in the
instant case is not justified in its reliance on this narrow test to conclude that Capehart projects are not public work.
869 Stat. 646 (1955), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1594 (Supp. 1962). Under
this act, the successful construction bidder causes a corporation to be formed which
in turn receives a fifty-year lease of land for development from the Government.
The corporation then borrows money from a bank on an FHA-insured mortgage,
and the money secured by the mortgage is used to pay the builder. The funds
normally paid as housing allowances to military personnel will be used by the Department of Defense to amortize the mortgage. Title to materials vests in the
Department of Defense upon partial payment, control of entire units are turned
over to the Department upon completion, and all stock in the corporation is transferred to the Government upon completion and acceptance of the project. The
Government is thus enabled to finance this housing over a long term rather than
in a single appropriation.
9 69 Stat. 651 (1955), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1594(a) (1958).
10The present case rejects the holdings of a number of federal courts that
the Miller and Capehart Acts are to be construed together and that the notice provisions of the Miller Act apply to Capehart Act bonds. Lasley v. United States
ex rel. Westerman, 285 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1960) ; United States ex rel. Acme Furnace
Fitting Co. v. Fort Meade Defense Housing Corp., 186 F. Supp. 639 (D.C. Md.
1960); Autrey v. Williams & Dunlap, 185 F. Supp. 802 (W.D. La. 1960). Contra,
United States ex rel. Gen. Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Maguire Homes, Inc.,
186 F. Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1959).
11 The sole purpose of the Capehart Act is to provide public military housing
for the Defense Department. In fact, title to this housing passes so swiftly to the
Government that, although liens might be impressed, they seldom could be enforced.
However, the Supreme Court has held that destruction of liens by Government
acquisition of property is a "taking" for which there must be just compensation.
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960). Surety bonds are the only practical and fair method of meeting this obligation while avoiding suit against the
Government.
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give more adequate notice of default, 1 2 even though this may hamper the
Miller Act's policy of providing a uniform bonding requirement for all
public projects. 13 In most public projects, the builder contracts directly
with the Government and thus may be able to renegotiate if he has miscalculated his costs,' 4 but in Capehart projects the available funds are
limited to the exact amount of the bid. 15 This characteristic of Capehart
financing may influence the surety to advance credit to the principal contractor in order to avoid a default. 16 Therefore, a Capehart surety is often
in the same position as a principal contractor who advances money to a
defaulting subcontractor in ordinary public projects, and the Capehart
surety is in need of notice as much as the ordinary principal contractor.
The Miller Act's requirement that subcontractors' materialmen give notice
of default to principal contractors effectively gives the principal contractor
the option of advancing or withholding payment to a subcontractor' 7 and
the condition in Capehart bonds that notice must be given to two parties
from among the principal, obligees, or surety achieves a similar result.
However, even though this dual notice in itself is not overly burdensome on
materialmen, one who mistakenly relies on the single notice provision of
the Miller Act could lose his right of action.
Although the dual notice provision is justified by the circumstances of
Capehart construction, congressional authorization for FHA and Defense
Department alteration of the Miller Act notice requirements is necessary.' 8
The present court found such authorization even though the wording of the
Capehart Act itself is ambiguous. On the one hand, it can be argued that
the effect of the 1956 amendment was to substitute the Secretary of Defense
for the contract officer specified in section 1 of the Miller Act, since the
12The court in Continental Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Robertson Lumber
Co., 305 F.2d 794 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962), assumed that
Capehart projects are "public work" and require the furnishing of a payment bond.
It then concluded that Congress, recognizing that Capehart housing is not "conventional Government construction," withdrew Capehart Act bonds from both the
procedural and substantive provisions of the Miller Act. The Eighth Circuit's handling of the "public work" issue is more reasonable than that of the court in the
instant case.
'3 Contra, 49 VA. L. REv. 174, 180 (1963).
14Moreover, many conventional Government contracts are on a strict cost-plus
basis.
15The prices on these houses are actually set by the Defense Department by
multiplying the monthly housing allowance of the officer's rank for which the house
is intended by the number of months in the term of the mortgage. This amount
less interest and carrying charges on the mortgage is the maximum cost to the
Government-corporation at which the house may be built. A contractor who agrees
to build these houses at this price is not able to receive any more money if his
costs rise since there is no other money appropriated to the project.
16 The contractor is bonded both for failure to pay materialmen and for any
failure to complete the project. 69 Stat. 646 (1955), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1594(a) (1958).
17 These notice provisions were a reasonable compromise between the desires
of materialmen and sureties. Cushman, Contractors' Bonds on Federal Construction Projects,41 DicK. L. Rxv. 1, 9 (1937).
18 Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936); Miller v.
United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1935); Campbell v. Galeno Chem. Co., 281
U.S. 599, 610 (1930).
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language of the amendment is identical to the clause designating the Miller
Act contract officer. 19 Thus, it could be concluded that Congress did not
intend the power of the Secretary of Defense to extend beyond approval
of sureties and prescription of substantive provisions similar to those sanctioned by section 1 of the Miller Act. Nevertheless, the 1956 amendment,
providing that Capehart bonds were sufficient compliance with section 1
of the Miller Act, can more accurately be read as indicating a congressional
intent to withdraw Capehart projects from the bonding requirements of the
Miller Act and avoid the possibility of a double bonding requirement.
Therefore, the procedural and notice provisions of section 2 of the Miller
Act, which apply only to bonds given pursuant to section 1 of that act,
would be inapplicable to bonds given on Capehart projects.
The legislative history of the 1956 amendment seems to support this
latter interpretation. A Senate Committee statement indicates an intention
to establish a separate category of bonds for Capehart projects:
In order to resolve a legal uncertainty concerning the bonding of contractors who build military housing, the bill provides
that such contractors shall furnish bonds satisfactory to the
FHA Commissioner and the Secretary of Defense. This change
was recommended by the Department of Defense to conform to
the usual FHA bonding requirements.20
A significant letter from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
to the House of Representatives after Senate passage of the amendment
declared that the Department was recommending this change in order to
make it clear that the provisions of the Miller Act (40 USC
270a) are not applicable to . . . [Capehart Act] Housing.

It

appears more appropriate to provide for use of the EHA dual
obligee form for both performance and payment bonds. The cost
of the FHA bond is substantially less than the cost of bonds
required by the Miller Act for public works so that the proposed
amendment will serve to decrease the cost of construction and
2
otherwise facilitate contractual relationships. '
The bonding provision recommended by this letter was identical to that
included in the final act. Since Congress accepted verbatim the proposal
of the Defense Department, the legislators probably also accepted the
Department's purpose in proposing it. Therefore, when the Senate
1949 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. §270(a) (1958) requires that bonds be provided with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the officer awarding such contract
20S. REP. No. 2005, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1956). See also 102 CONG. REC.
88742 (1956)
(remarks of Senator Sparkman).
1
Letter From Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense to Brent Spence, Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, June 4, 1956, in Hearings
on H.R. 10157 Before the Howe Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.
2d Sess. 195 (1956).
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stated that the purpose of the amendment was to conform bonds on
Capehart projects to the usual FHA bonding requirements, it was referring
to a substitution of FHA form bonds for Miller Act bonds. Administrative
power to prescribe the procedural requirements of bonds was necessary to
effectuate the desire for lower cost coverage. In fact, the FHA,22 as well
as the Department of Defense, has interpreted the amendment as authorizing this discretion.
Even though these dual notice requirements were properly included in
the present bonds, the plaintiffs' failure to give such notice should not,
of itself, provide a complete defense for the surety. Although ambiguities
in a bond are interpreted against a corporate insurer,23 most courts will

strictly enforce a dear provision in a bond that prompt notice of default
is to be a condition precedent to liability.24

Nevertheless, there is au-

thority for the proposition that breach of a notice condition will not relieve
the insurer from liability unless the breach contributed to the insurer's
loss.2 5

Sureties should not be allowed to avoid, because of technicalities,

the protection agreed to in the surety contract, especially when the plaintiff
was not a party to the contract and therefore has less occasion to know
its details. Moreover, the statutory policy of providing coverage for
materialmen is an added reason for not permitting the evasion of liability
22 The FHA has the power to protect its interest in mortgaged property. See
48 Stat. 1248 (1934), 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b) (1958). These bond forms were drawn
up by the Administration pursuant to its regulation which provides that: "Assurance
for the completion of a project shall be a periormance bond and a payment bond
satisfactory to the Commissioner and the Secretary of Defense or his designee with
the mortgagor and mortgagee as joint obligees." 24 C.F.R. § 803.27 (1962). The
fact that under this regulation not only the sureties but also the bonds themselves
must be satisfactory to the Secretary of Defense indicates that the FHA firmly
believes that there has been a legislative delegation of administrative discretion.
23The rule that contracts are to be interpreted in favor of a surety is not extended
to corporate sureties for profit. United States ex rel. Hill v. American Sur. Co.,
200 U.S. 197 (1906); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States ex rel.
Pressed Brick Co., 191 U.S. 416 (1903); American Sur. Co. v. Pauly, 170 U.S.
133 (1898). For an example of the extent to which courts will go in resolving
ambiguities against sureties see Southern Sur. Co. v. MacMillan Co., 58 F.2d 541
(10th24 Cir. 1932).
? E.g., Murray v. American Sur. Co., 69 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1934); New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Central Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 4 F.2d 203 (8th Cir. 1925) ; see
SmsoN, SuRETYsHiI 171 (1960) ; 4 WLLISTON, CoNmAcTs § 1238 (2d ed. 1936).
This is in accord with the general rule that courts cannot interpret away the plain
meaning of a contract provision. See Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics Say. Bank &
Trust Co., 183 U.S. 402, 419 (1902).
25 Illinois Sur. Co. v. Huber, 57 Ind. App. 408, 413, 107 N.E. 298, 300 (1914);
School District v. McCurley, 92 Kan. 53, 58, 142 Pac. 1077, 1079 (1914). See also
Community Bldg. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 8 F.2d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1925);
Lakeside Land Co. v. Empire State Sur. Co., 105 Minn. 213, 216, 117 N.W. 431,
432 (1908); Heffernan v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 37 Wash. 477, 480, 79
Pac. 1095, 1096 (1905). These cases concerned surety bonds which insured against
both failure to complete a project on time and total default by the contractor. A
failure of the insured to give the required notice to the surety of the contractor's
inability to complete the project on time did not prevent the insured from collecting
for the contractor's subsequent total default when the surety was notified of this
default. The cases are significant insofar as the inability of the contractor to complete the project on time was indicative of the possibility of a complete default in
the future. They also contain general statements that the surety can enforce conditions only when the plaintiff's failure to comply with them has injured the surety.
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because of technical inadequacies. The primary purpose of the notice requirement in the present bond is to allow the surety to take steps to avoid
or mitigate any anticipated loss by withholding or extending credit to a
faltering principal contractor. Sureties should be free from liability only
to the extent that they have incurred any loss because of failure to give
notice.

26

2

6 Complaints on Capehart Act bonds should be brought in the name of the real
party in interest rather than, as in the instant case, in the name of the United
States. Unless otherwise provided, "every suit must be prosecuted by the real
party in interest who, by the substantive law, possesses the right sought to be
enforced." 2 BARRON & HOLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 482, at 7

(Wright ed. 1961), discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).

The United States is not

an obligee on the present bond as it is on Miller Act bonds and the Miller Act's
authorization of suits brought in the name of the United States is only applicable
to bonds given under § 1 of that Act. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) states that "When
a statute of the United States so provides, an action for the use or benefit of another
shall be brought in the name of the United States." There is no statutory authorization of the present action, and therefore an action can be maintained by the
United States only on a showing that it has a definite obligation to either the
use-plaintiff or the public to bring this action. See 3 MOoRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
ff 17.15, at 1377-78 (2d ed. 1948). In the absence of such a showing of special obligation, the United States is not a proper party plaintiff in suits based on Capehart
bonds.

